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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Purpose 
This paper empirically investigates whether call auctions which batch orders for simultaneous 
execution, may restrain stock market volatility.   
 
Design / Methodology / Approach 
We use high frequency data to investigate volatility changes following the suspension of 
opening and closing call auctions on the National Stock Exchange of India in June 1999.  We 
evaluate this issue by considering both modelled and realised volatility.  Using a GARCH 
approach we model intra-day volatility for the trading days preceding and succeeding the 
auction suspension.  We also scrutinise return distributions to look for volatility changes 
during different parts of the day.  
 
Findings 
When interpreted collectively, our empirical results suggest that the auction suspension was 
followed by reduced volatility particularly in the middle of the trading day and at the closing.   
 
Practical implications 
Given that auctions are often incorporated in trading systems with the aim of curtailing 
volatility, our main conclusion, that the auction suspension was followed by lower volatility, 
has important practical inferences.  Auctions cannot be automatically relied on to reduce 
volatility.  The intricacies of the auction protocol and their interaction with ancillary market 
microstructure features may impact on auction efficacy. 
 
Originality / value 
The paper adopts a novel approach towards assessing the effectiveness of call auctions by 
considering an unusual occurrence of an auction suspension.  The empirical setting enables 
a clear comparison of the respective regimes since the auction and the post-suspension 
period do not materially differ in other subsidiary aspects.  This is a noteworthy factor, since 
the empirical contexts considered in prior studies, often feature several simultaneous 
changes.   
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1.  Introduction 
In this paper we evaluate the impact of an unusual empirical market microstructure 
occurrence, namely: the suspension of opening and closing call auctions by the 
National Stock Exchange of India (NSE) on the 9th June 1999.  The main impetus for 
this study is the research by Camilleri and Green (2009) which yielded contrasting, 
although highly significant results in terms of volatility changes around this auction 
suspension.  A study of the auction suspension by the NSE presents the noteworthy 
advantage that it involves a comparison between two regimes which differ only in 
terms of the presence of the auction. This enables a relatively clear assessment of 
the impact of the suspension, given that other market features on the exchange 
remained unchanged.  
One main objective in designing trading protocols is to curtail excess volatility. This 
helps to enhance price discovery by minimizing market movements which push 
prices away from fundamental values.  The efficacy of call auctions in promoting this 
objective, as compared to continuous trading, is one important issue in the design of 
trading protocols.  In a call auction, orders are batched together and executed 
simultaneously at a common price at a given point in time.  By contrast, in a 
continuous system, trading may occur at any instant when two orders on the opposite 
side of the market meet in price.  In theory, call auctions provide an efficient 
mechanism for aggregating diverse information because trading does not take place 
until price discovery has occurred.  In continuous systems, price discovery and 
trading take place simultaneously implying that trades may occur at “false” prices 
(Schwartz, 2000).   
If call auctions reduce fluctuations around the fundamental values of securities, this 
should result in lower volatility during the trading day. It is therefore important to 
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assess intra-day volatility when considering auction effectiveness.  Despite this, the 
issue of whether call auctions do actually restrain volatility is still unresolved and 
different studies yield contrasting results.  The fact that call auctions may vary in 
structure makes it difficult to carry out clear-cut comparisons between auctions and 
continuous trading.   
With reference to the empirical context considered in this paper, Camilleri and Green 
(2009) reported that, following the 1999 auction suspension by the NSE, there was a 
highly significant drop in intra-day volatility but also significantly higher tendencies for 
reversals of overnight returns.  We delve deeper into this puzzle by applying various 
tests on data which are sampled at higher frequencies than those used in the 
previous studies.   
We use GARCH models and scrutinise return distributions to evaluate the changes in 
intra-day volatility following the auction suspension.  This is an important aspect of 
this study since, by focusing on both realised and modelled volatility, one may expect 
to obtain richer insights (Zhang and Hu; 2013).   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 includes a review of relevant 
literature, while section 3 describes the empirical context and the data.  In section 4, 
we investigate the impact of the auction suspension through GARCH models.  In 
section 5, we undertake a comparison of return distributions as between the auction 
period and the post-suspension period.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Review of Literature 
There are two trading frameworks which commonly feature in order-driven systems: 
call auctions and continuous trading.  The latter systems may be combined in a 
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hybrid trading setup, such as an auction held at the start and at the close of the day, 
with continous trading in between.  Call auction protocols vary and therefore auctions 
may have different impacts on trading activity (Comerton-Forde and Rydge, 2006).  
This partly explains the mixed evidence on call auction efficacy described in this 
section.  Furthermore, ancillary operational features differ across markets and 
therefore even similarly-structured auctions may have different implications in 
different contexts.   
The potential for auctions to curtail volatility mainly rests on the expectation that they 
increase pricing efficiency, and thus one may deduce that they reduce the dispersion 
of prices around their fundamental values.  Economides and Schwartz (1995) argued 
that call auctions aggregate different expectations of market participants thereby 
increasing price discovery and pricing efficiency.  Schwartz (2000) contrasted the 
notion of a call auction market where trades are executed after price discovery 
occurs, with the operation of a continuous market where prices are discovered whilst 
trading occurs.  Madhavan (1992) theoretically investigated the performance of 
different market structures and concluded that auctions aggregate information more 
efficiently, especially when the level of asymmetric information in the market is high, 
and dealers are reluctant to take the opposite sides of trades.   
Despite this, the model proposed by Caillaud and Mezzetti (2004) indicates that there 
may be limitations in the extent to which call auctions can aggregate information 
efficiently.  In particular, some market participants may use the auction setup to 
conceal information from other traders, such as giving up profitable trading 
opportunities in an initial auction, in the hope that the resulting price movements 
materialise in higher subsequent profits.   
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One central issue in the debate between call auctions and continuous trading is the 
trade-off between information efficiency and immediacy.  In particular, periodic 
auctions lack continuity and therefore reduce the immediacy of trading.  In this way, 
they may also result in higher information costs given that current prices are available 
less frequently (Madhavan, 1992).  However, the latter arguments are less relevant 
when call auctions are used at the opening or closing, since trading still occurs 
continuously for the rest of the day.   
Various authors have empirically investigated the pricing efficiency of auctions as 
postulated by the above theoretical arguments.  An investigation of the pre-open call 
auction of the (former) Paris Bourse by Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1999), suggests that 
price discovery reaches its peak in the last minutes of the auction, whereas orders 
posted during the initial minutes may be classified as “noise”.  This contrasts with 
other findings, for example, that most of the orders at the pre-opening period of the 
Toronto Stock Exchange (Davies, 2003) and the West-African Bourse (Dia and 
Pouget, 2011) are submitted with the intention of trading.   
Chang et. al. (2008) considered the introduction of opening and closing call auctions 
on the Singapore Stock Exchange in the year 2000.  They reported higher pricing 
efficiency and reduced volatility especially in the case of liquid stocks.  Chelley-
Steeley (2008) studied the introduction of a closing call auction on the London Stock 
Exchange in 1997 and reported higher pricing efficiency, especially for the least 
active stocks.  Frino, Gerace and Lepone (2008) considered the liquidity changes for 
the stocks trading on the Italian Bourse which in 2001 transitioned from an auction 
market to a specialist system.  The authors noted a reduction in the price impact of 
trades and obtained indications that a specialist setup may be better equipped to 
handle the adverse selection risk related to informed trading.  Madhavan and 
Panchapagesan (2000) analysed the opening auction on the New York Stock 
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Exchange (NYSE) and found that call auctions might not be the ideal trading setup 
for less liquid stocks, given that order imbalances may lead to mispricings.   
Other studies have empirically compared auction price characteristics with those of 
the continuous trading session on a given market (Amihud and Mendelson, 1987;  
Shastri, Shastri and Sirodom, 1995).  It was found that auction prices were more 
volatile; yet this might also be due to the fact that call auctions are most commonly 
held at the opening and/or closing of the session when volatility tends to be higher 
than during the rest of the day.  The latter argument is corroborated by the empirical 
study of Ronen (1998) for the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange: when the auction was 
moved from the closing to the opening in 1988, no significant differences in opening 
volatility were discerned.   
Biais and Pouget (2000) set up experimental markets involving call auctions.  They 
concluded that price discovery may be augmented by organising a pre-opening 
period prior to the auction without executing any trades. This disseminates a volume-
maximising price based on the incoming orders.   
Call auctions may impact on intra-day volatility in terms of their prospects for 
curtailing market manipulation.  In the theoretical model of Hillion and Suominen 
(2004), and the empirical research of Chang et. al. (2008) focusing on the Singapore 
Stock Exchange, call auctions are successful in reducing the potential to manipulate 
closing prices.  Similarly, Pinfold and He (2012) reported higher pricing efficiency and 
lower market manipulation potential following the introduction of an auction on the 
New Zealand stock market.  
Comerton-Forde and Rydge (2006) considered two cases of manipulative orders: the 
first one for a liquid stock and the second one for an illiquid stock.  The authors 
studied how auctions featuring different matching algorithms coped with manipulation 
This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear on www.um.edu.mt.  
Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express 
permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
 
Camilleri,S.J. (2015) "Do call auctions curtail price volatility? Evidence from the National Stock 
Exchange of India", Managerial Finance, 41 (1), pp. 67 - 79. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 7 
attempts.  In case of the illiquid stock, trading took place in the presence of the 
manipulative order, yet no market clearing price could be established when this order 
was removed.  This casts doubts on the notion that auctions are particularly suited to 
trade less liquid stocks.  The authors argued that the auction algorithm on its own 
might be unable to restrain the effects of manipulative orders; and complementary 
features such as order restrictions and random auction termination time may thus be 
required.   
Our empirical setting of the auction suspension on NSE in June 1999 was analysed 
by Camilleri and Green (2009) who focused on the changes in efficiency, liquidity and 
volatility.  The authors obtained overall evidence that the auctions did not result in 
significant improvements in these factors.  Their investigation found mixed evidence 
on the relationship between the auction setup and volatility.  The price dispersion 
during the trading day decreased significantly following the suspension, implying 
lower intra-day volatility.  Yet, the authors also reported significantly higher overnight 
volatility following suspension, given that reversals of overnight returns became more 
prominent.   
When considered collectively, the above findings imply that the relationship between 
call auctions and volatility is still an unresolved issue; and therefore this empirical 
study offers a contribution towards filling this lacuna.   
 
3.  Empirical Setting and Data 
The National Stock Exchange of India (NSE) was established in 1994 and is one of 
two major Indian exchanges.  As at May 2013, around 1,600 equities traded on NSE 
and the volume on a typical day was over 5 million transactions.  The NSE is an 
order-driven market, and offers particular advantages for a study of this kind, due to a 
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comprehensive number of traded equities and high trading volumes for the most 
liquid stocks. 
The exchange introduced opening and closing call auctions in the late 1990s.  The 
latter established prices for individual securities in a way to maximise the traded 
quantity.  Orders could be modified or cancelled at any time.  When auctions were in 
effect, the opening auction was held between 09:55 and 10:00, followed by 
continuous trading until around 15:30, and a final closing auction between 15:50 and 
15:55.  The opening and closing auctions were suspended without prior notice on 9th 
June 1999.  Camilleri and Green (2009) offer background information about these 
auctions and their suspension which could have been related to software problems.  
They report that trading activity tended to be higher in the closing auction as 
compared to the opening one.   
This study uses NSE Nifty Index intra-day data.  The Nifty is one of the main indices 
compiled by NSE, and is composed of 50 large-capitalisation stocks.  In sampling the 
intra-day data, we started with the sixteen trading days immediately preceding 
suspension and the sixteen days following suspension.  The first regime (auction 
period) consists of the trading days from 18th May 1999 to 8th June 1999, while the 
second regime (suspension period) consists of trading days from 9th June 1999 until 
30th June 1999.  Two days which were interrupted by trading halts were discarded 
(21st May and 28th June 1999), and the final sample thus consisted of fifteen trading 
days in each regime.   
Intra-day observations typically started at 10:00 and ended at 15:29 yielding a total of 
330 observations at one minute intervals for each trading day.  In case of the auction 
period, more observations were available owing to the additional trading time.  The 
twenty-minute trading gap, between the continuous trading session and the closing 
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auction was treated as a regular one-minute interval, since these returns were 
typically in a similar range to that of the regular one-minute returns.  First-Order 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests rejected the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 95% 
confidence level for all log return data.   
 
4.  GARCH Models 
In this section we estimate GARCH models using the Nifty Index observations 
sampled at one-minute frequency to assess whether the auction suspension led to 
any changes in intra-day volatility.  We estimate a different GARCH model for each of 
the fifteen sampled auction days; and these are compared to a set of estimated 
GARCH models for the fifteen post-suspension days.  We used the Akaike 
Information Criterion and the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion to select the standard 
return generating process for the available time series, which comprise the intra-day 
observations of the 30 sampled trading days.  The criteria selected an AR(1) model 
for over half of the data sets.  An AR(1) was therefore adopted as the standard return 
generation process for each GARCH model which was estimated using the time 
series for the particular day.   
LM heteroskedasticity tests (Engle; 1982) rejected the Null Hypothesis of no ARCH 
effects at the 95% level of confidence for around 50% of the data sets.  Tests on the 
degree of asymmetry in conditional volatility indicated that it was not necessary to 
account for this feature. [1]   
We now proceed with the estimation of the GARCH models.  In line with Andersen 
and Bollerslev (1997) we chose a GARCH (1,1) specification since this usually 
provides acceptable estimates: 
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1
2
1   ttt hh            
    (1) 
where ht denotes the conditional variance which depends on past information, εt2 is 
the unexpected squared return observed during period t, and ω, α, β are parameters. 
[2]   
In order to obtain estimates which more accurately model intra-day volatility, and to 
maximise the chances of obtaining estimates for each sampled trading day, we 
estimated two different GARCH models on the one-minute observations of the Nifty 
Index.  The first model assumed that the conditional distribution of the errors was 
normal whilst the second model assumed that it followed a student-t distribution.  In 
the former case, three out of thirty estimates failed to converge, whilst in the latter 
case, ten estimates did not converge.  This suggests that the volatility patterns which 
transpired during the latter trading days, were somewhat dissimilar from the 
characteristics which are usually captured through GARCH models.  A number of 
estimates were omitted due to any one of the following features:  
a) A Wald Test failed to reject the Null Hypothesis that (α + β) = 1, since this 
violates the required stationarity condition of GARCH models.   
b) The estimated coefficient for the lagged conditional variance was negative and 
highly significant since such an estimate does not make sense (Engle; 2001).   
c) The R2 statistic was negative indicating very poor explanatory power.   
Following these omissions, we used the Akaike Information Criterion to select the 
preferred model for each trading day: the normal distribution model or the t-
distribution in those cases where both were still available.  This resulted in 23 
GARCH models available for analysis, each replicating the characteristics of the 
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volatility of the NIFTY Index observations sampled at one-minute intervals for the 
respective trading day. Thirteen of these models relate to trading days from the 
auction period whilst ten estimates model trading days from the suspension period 
(Tables 1 and 2).  
The GARCH (1,1) estimates show that the AR(1) coefficient of the return equation is 
significant.  Despite that this is inconsistent with weak-form efficiency (Fama, 1970), 
some degree of serial dependence may be expected in high-frequency data, where 
returns are affected by factors such as non-synchronous trading and the bid-ask 
bounce.  As regards the conditional variance equation, most of the α and β are 
significant, and Wald tests reject the null hypothesis that α + β = 0.  We thus infer that 
lagged errors and shocks have a significant effect on conditional volatility.   
___________________________________________________________________ 
Tables 1 and 2 about here 
___________________________________________________________________ 
We now turn to the interpretation of the GARCH coefficients.  According to Franses 
and Van Dijk (2000), the unconditional mean of εt2 or the unconditional variance of εt 
is equal to: 




1
2
          
     (2) 
Volatility is expected to converge to this value over the long-term.  α and β are the 
ARMA components of the conditional variance i.e. the unexpected lagged squared 
return and the lagged conditional variance.  These may be interpreted as temporary 
deviations around the unconditional variance which depend on past information.  
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Most of these coefficients, especially those relating to β, are significant and we may 
thus conclude that there is a substantial degree of persistence in the Nifty index.   
Table 3 shows the results of t-tests on the GARCH model coefficients to examine any 
differences between the auction period and the suspension period.  The reduction in 
α was significant at the 90% level of confidence, yet this did not lead to any 
significant difference in the combined GARCH coefficients (α + β).  Still, the results 
indicate an overall highly significant drop in the unconditional variance of εt as shown 
in the last column.   
___________________________________________________________________ 
Table 3 about here 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
5.  Scrutinising Return Distributions 
In the case of high-frequency data, realized volatility may prove to be a superior 
measure than modelled volatility (Dacorogna, et. al., 2001, pp. 44) and in addition 
one may expect to garner richer insights when using both approaches (Zhang and 
Hu, 2013).  We thus consider changes in the intra-day realised return distributions, 
and test whether the initial volatility consists of over-reactions or noise.   
For each of the 30 sampled trading days, we first split the one-minute returns into 
opening (comprising the first 40 observations), closing (comprising the final 40 
observations) and middle of the day (remaining observations). In testing for the 
differences in volatility during these sections of the day, we used two volatility 
proxies: the Mean Squared Returns and the Return Standard Deviations for the 
particular intra-day period.  Two-tailed paired sample t-tests (Table 4) rejected the 
hypotheses of no difference between the returns across the trading day at the 95% 
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level of confidence, confirming that volatility reached its peak at the opening phase 
and then rose again towards the end.   
___________________________________________________________________ 
Tables 4 and 5 about here 
___________________________________________________________________ 
We now consider the differences between the auction and the suspension period 
across the different sections of the trading days.  The statistics for the opening 
distributions (Table 5) indicate an increase in opening volatility following suspension. 
This is in contrast to the middle-of-the-day and the closing distributions which 
suggest lower volatility following suspension.  As regards the kurtosis for the whole 
30 days, the opening returns tend to be the most peak-shaped, hinting that whilst the 
opening is more volatile, it is also characterised by a number of returns which are 
close to zero.  Log return plots confirm that the opening is characterised by a large 
return taking place within the first fifteen minutes, followed by smaller returns.  Such 
patterns suggest that prices initially fluctuate in response to overnight news, and 
subsequent movements depend on temporary liquidity features.  If the large return is 
not subsequently reversed, this suggests that most of the initial price discovery 
occurs within one or two minutes.  However, if the large return is then reversed or 
partially reversed, this might imply that the initial volatility is more nearly noise or 
over-reaction.   
We therefore start by distinguishing between reinforcements and reversals of initial 
returns.  When the direction of the return for the first fifteen minutes is the same as 
that of the return for the rest of the day, the sequence is classified as a 
reinforcement.  When the initial fifteen-minute return changes direction during the 
rest of the day, the sequence is classified as a reversal.  A note on possible 
limitations of this methodology is warranted.  The test may be biased in favour of 
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reinforcements, due to market factors such as larger orders executing in smaller 
components (Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans, 1997) and non-synchronous 
trading (Camilleri and Green, 2014).  In addition, the underlying news pattern (which 
is not observed) may in fact justify some instances of reversal.  Yet, it may be 
expected that over a 30 day sample this methodology yields reasonably reliable 
results.   
Results shown in Table 6 indicate that reversals are more prominent than 
reinforcements.[3]  The fact that reversals are more evident in the auction period 
suggests that the higher initial volatility in the suspension period (Table 5) should be 
interpreted with caution, since there seemes to be a higher probabilty that the larger 
price movements of the suspension period were in fact justified.  This evidence is in 
line with the findings of Camilleri and Green (2009) that the NSE auction suspension 
was followed by higher efficiency and lower intra-day volatility.  The latter study 
focussed on a longer 120-trading day period, and therefore provides some 
reassurance that the new intra-day results reported in this paper are not sample-
specific.  
___________________________________________________________________ 
Table 6 about here 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
6.  Conclusion 
We evaluated the changes in intra-day volatility following the suspension of opening 
and closing call auctions on the NSE.  GARCH models estimated on intra-day data 
point at a significant drop in the response of the conditional variance to lagged 
shocks, as well as a highly significant drop in the unconditional variance following the 
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suspension.  We also considered one-minute return distributions and found that the 
suspension period is characterised by lower volatility in the middle-of-the-day and the 
closing.  The opening volatility increased following the suspension, yet the auction 
period is characterised by higher incidence of reversals of opening returns 
suggesting that there is a higher possibility of unjustified opening volatility during the 
auction period.  Collectively these results cast doubt on whether any expected 
benefits of call auctions were in fact materialising, since NSE witnessed an overall 
drop in intra-day volatility following the auction suspension.  When compared to the 
prior mixed findings of Camilleri and Green (2009), the above results offer a more 
detailed assessment and contribute towards a clearer insight of the volatility 
changes, which took place following the NSE auction suspension.   
The above evidence might not serve as a case for the universal suspension of call 
auctions; yet it is useful from the point of view of market designers who should not 
rely on auctions as a carte blanche for lower volatility and higher efficiency.  Thought 
has to be given to the actual design of auctions, as auctions can be used to mislead 
traders (Biais, Hillion and Spatt, 1999) and to manipulate stock prices (Comerton-
Forde and Rydge, 2006).  The efficiency of the price discovery process at the 
opening might depend on whether participants may submit multiple orders and 
whether orders may be withdrawn before the opening  (Chakraborty, Pagano and 
Schwartz, 2012).  Similarly, pre-trade transparency may impact on market quality in a 
non-linear way (Eom, Ok and Park, 2007).  There is also a possibility that auctions 
might not attract sufficient trading activity which may compromise their efficacy when 
order imbalances prevail (Madhavan and Panchapagesan, 2000). 
This suggests that more research is required to investigate the interaction of call 
auctions with other market microstructure features and why their expected benefits 
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may not materialise.  We believe that this constitutes an important aspect of future 
research.   
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Tables: 
 
Table 1: GARCH Models for one-minute frequency data - Auction period 
 
Day 
 
AR 
Intercept 
ˆ  
AR Lag 
ˆ  R
2 
 
 
Coeff: ˆ  
 
 
Coeff: ˆ  
 
Coeff: ˆ  
 
Wald 
 
A 1 -0.000008 0.4095 *** 0.1613 2.8E-07 0.1226 0.1992 * 14.8 
t (0.25) (7.75)  (0.0688) (1.25) (1.84) {65.9} 
A 2 0.000018 0.2757 *** 0.1102 9.1E-09 0.0185 0.9506 *** 63509.7 
n (0.58) (5.47)  (0.0021) (1.34) (63.33) {62.3} 
A 3 -0.000027 0.4386 *** 0.1916 2.2E-08 0.0457 0.8967 *** 10545.7 
t (0.80) (8.90)  (0.0044) (1.31) (26.17) {38.0} 
A 4 0.000022 0.3881 *** 0.1121 3.6E-08 0.0346 0.8593 *** 6574.7 
n (0.67) (7.65)  (0.0091) (1.51) (34.82) {92.4} 
A 5 0.000026 0.2838 *** 0.0925 1.2E-08 0.0626 ** 0.8780 *** 9889.6 
n (1.04) (5.45)  (0.0030) (2.36) (32.67) {38.8} 
A 6 -0.000027 0.3747 *** 0.1680 3.6E-08 0.1505 *** 0.7985 *** 3962.3 
n (0.70) (6.56)  (0.0081) (2.71) (17.25) {7.4} 
A 8 -0.000038 0.4000 *** 0.1129 3.9E-08 0.0835 ** 0.8655 *** 8665.2 
n (0.82) (7.83)  (0.0087) (2.29) (25.90) {21.2} 
A 9 0.000043 0.3750 *** 0.1789 4.1E-08 0.2257 *** 0.6496 *** 1211.5 
n (1.59) (7.11)  (0.0105) (3.37) (12.06) {17.4} 
A 10 0.000021 0.3500 *** 0.1327 1.4E-08 0.0939 ** 0.8756 *** 7225.3 
t (0.65) (6.67)  (0.0028) (2.21) (24.75) {4.5} 
A 11 0.000010 0.3923 *** 0.1339 6.1E-09 0.0344 * 0.9260 *** 28603.8 
n (0.44) (7.74)  (0.0015) (1.70) (44.94) {48.3} 
A 13 -0.000001 0.2195 *** 0.1927 9.8E-09 0.0773 ** 0.8578 *** 5168.3 
t (0.05) (4.34)  (0.0023) (2.15) (26.05) {21.4} 
A 14 -0.000009 0.3283 *** 0.0840 2.5E-08 0.0664 0.8334 *** 1902.2 
t (0.38) (6.24)  (0.0054) (1.37) (20.17) {17.8} 
A 15 0.000028 0.4129 *** 0.2092 7.7E-08 0.2977 *** 0.3661 *** 154.4 
n (1. 23) (8.74)  (0.0209) (3.49) (5.43) {34.1} 
 
The first column shows the trading day in the auction period (A) or the suspension period (S), 
whilst the letter “t” or “n” indicates whether the conditional distribution for the error terms was 
assumed to be normal (n) or student-t (t).  Log returns were modelled as an AR(1) process, 
where φ refers to the intercept and ρ is the estimated coefficient of the lagged return.  T-ratios 
are shown in brackets underneath the coefficients and significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% 
confidence levels is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively.  R2 shows the explanatory power of 
the regression.  The coefficients of the GARCH process are ω (the intercept), α (lagged error 
term) and β (lagged conditional variance).  The final column shows the results for the Wald 
Tests on the GARCH process.  The null hypothesis of the first test is that α=0 and β=0.  The test 
is χ2(2) distributed with a 95% critical value of 5.991.  The result for the second Wald test is 
shown in braces underneath.  The null hypothesis is that α+β=1 and the test is χ2(1) distributed 
with a 95% critical value of 3.841.  When the null hypothesis was not rejected, the particular 
model was discarded (therefore not reported in the table).   
 
 
This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear on www.um.edu.mt.  
Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express 
permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
 
Camilleri,S.J. (2015) "Do call auctions curtail price volatility? Evidence from the National Stock 
Exchange of India", Managerial Finance, 41 (1), pp. 67 - 79. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 21 
 
Table 2: GARCH Models for one-minute frequency data - Suspension period 
 
Day 
 
AR 
Intercept 
ˆ  
AR Lag 
ˆ  R
2 
 
 
Coeff: ˆ  
 
 
Coeff: ˆ  
 
Coeff: ˆ  
 
Wald 
 
S 2 -0.000016 0.2634 *** 0.1563 3.2E-09 0.0426 ** 0.9358 *** 37260.4 
n (0.76) (5.20)  (0.0008) (2.04) (47.82) {16.0} 
S 3 -0.000018 0.3003 *** 0.0771 2.1E-09 0.0420 0.9448 *** 39661.2 
t (0.79) (5.59)  (0.0004) (1.61) (40.67) {4.8} 
S 4 0.000034 0.3343 *** 0.5643 8.7E-09 0.0475 ** 0.8857 *** 12464.2 
n (1.56) (7.63)  (0.0022) (2.18) (38.45) {63.9} 
S 7 0.000019 0.3382 *** 0.0728 2.4E-08 0.0618 0.8567 *** 4496.6 
t (0.65) (6.45)  (0.0046) (1.11) (15.96) {33.4} 
S 9 0.000032 0.2957 *** 0.1558 1.2E-08 0.0448 0.8647 *** 5377.8 
t (1.53) (5.52)  (0.0024) (0.88) (16.89) {53.0} 
S 11 -0.000040 0.3704 *** 0.1453 1.1E-08 0.0227 0.9370 *** 15808.4 
t (1.46) (7.41)  (0.0023) (1.18) (49.33) {26.5} 
S 12 -0.000007 0.3961 *** 0.1859 4.6E-08 0.0732 * 0.7430 *** 1625.9 
n (0.26) (7.50)  (0.0117) (1.84) (17.67) {81.7} 
S 13 -0.000008 0.3721 *** 0.1356 9.7E-09 0.0372 0.9017 *** 14297.6 
n (0.34) (7.14)  (0.0020) (0.95) (23.56) {57.9} 
S 14 -0.000015 0.2332 *** 0.0203 3.6E-08 0.1548 ** 0.5373 *** 156.2 
t (0.82) (3.90)  (0.0093) (2.17) (7.71) {28.7} 
S 15 -0.000007 0.3129 *** 0.0845 2.1E-08 0.0579 0.7502 *** 688.5 
t (0.39) (5.75)  (0.0050) (0.96) (12.67) {36.2} 
 
Refer to explanatory note in Table 1.   
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Table 3: T-Tests for return and GARCH model Coefficients 
 
 ˆ  ˆ  ˆ  ˆ  ˆ   ˆˆ   )ˆˆ1/(ˆ    
Mean (Auction) 0.0000044 0.358 0.000000047 0.101 0.766 0.867 0.00000036 
Mean 
(Suspension) -0.000003 0.322 0.000000017 0.058 0.836 0.894 0.00000018 
Variance (Auction) 6.2E-10 0.004 5.4E-15 0.007 0.052 0.033 3.7E-14 
Variance 
(Suspension) 5.6E-10 0.003 2.1E-16 0.001 0.016 0.009 4.7E-15 
Pooled Variance 5.9E-10 0.003 3.2E-15 0.004 0.037 0.023 2.3E-14 
t-Statistic 0.686 1.455 1.242 1.534 * -0.865 -0.429 2.833 *** 
t Critical Value 
one-tail (95%) 1.721 1.721 1.721 1.721 1.721 1.721 1.721 
t Critical Value 
two-tail (95%) 2.080 2.080 2.080 2.080 2.080 2.080 2.080 
 
The table shows the results for t-tests to infer any significant differences in the GARCH coefficients 
between the auction and the suspension period.  Statistics were based on 13 trading days for the auction 
period and 10 trading days for the suspension period.  Significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% 
confidence levels is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively.   
 
While the reduction in α is only significant at the 90% level of confidence when considering a one-tailed 
test, and the increase in β is insignificant, we note an overall highly significant drop in the unconditional 
variance of εt as measured by [ω / (1-α–β)].   
 
For each coefficient, the reported t-tests assumed equal variances for the auction and the suspension 
periods.  T-tests assuming unequal variances were also conducted.  The latter tests led to the same 
inferences, except that the reduction in ω becomes significant at the 90% level of confidence, when 
considering a one-tailed test.   
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Table 4: T-tests on differences in volatility during the trading day   
 
PANEL A:  Two-tailed paired sample t-tests tests on mean squared returns of the 
30 sampled trading days 
 
Null Hypothesis 
 
Outcome 
- Confidence Level 
T-Statistic 
 
Critical 
Value 
    
No Diff. Between Open. & Mid. Rejected - 95%  3.6 2.0 
No Diff. Between Open. & Clos. Rejected - 95%  2.8 2.0 
No Diff. Between Mid. & Clos. Rejected - 95%  2.2 2.0 
    
 
PANEL B: Two-tailed paired sample t-tests tests on return std. deviations of the 30 
sampled trading days 
 
Null Hypothesis 
 
Outcome 
- Confidence Level 
T-Statistic 
 
Critical 
Value 
    
No Diff. Between Open. & Mid. Rejected - 95%  6.2 2.0 
No Diff. Between Open. & Clos. Rejected - 95%  4.4 2.0 
No Diff. Between Mid. & Clos. Rejected - 95%  3.6 2.0 
    
 
The table shows the outcomes of two-tailed paired sample t-tests on the differences in 
volatility during the opening, middle-of-the-day and closing periods.  Panel A shows the 
outcomes of tests on Mean Squared Returns as a volatility proxy.  Panel B shows the 
outcomes of tests on Return Standard Deviations as a volatility proxy.  The null 
hypothesis of no difference between the respective volatility proxies during the different 
periods of the day is uniformly rejected at the 95% level of confidence.   
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Table 5: Summary statistics for one-minute return distributions 
 
  LOG  RETURNS SQUARED  LOG  RETURNS 
  St.Dev Skew. K-3 Mean St.Dev Max Min 
         
Op. Avg : 30 Days 0.0012 0.835 6.710 0.00000193 0.0000068 0.0000403 0 
Mid. Avg : 30 Days 0.0005 -0.048 1.312 0.00000027 0.0000005 0.0000041 0 
Cl. Avg : 30 Days 0.0007 0.155 0.428 0.00000055 0.0000009 0.0000041 0 
         
Op. Avg: A 0.0012 0.339 4.313 0.00000164 0.0000047 0.0000278 0 
Op. Avg: S 0.0012 1.330 9.106 0.00000222 0.0000088 0.0000528 0 
         
Mid. Avg: A 0.0006 -0.131 1.740 0.00000034 0.0000006 0.0000054 0 
Mid. Avg: S 0.0004 0.035 0.884 0.00000020 0.0000003 0.0000028 0 
         
Cl. Avg: A 0.0008 0.156 0.692 0.00000079 0.0000014 0.0000062 0 
Cl. Avg: S 0.0005 0.153 0.165 0.00000031 0.0000004 0.0000020 0 
 
The table shows summary statistics for Intra-Day Return Distributions.  The columns indicate the 
following: (1) Period of the Day (Opening / Middle / Closing); (2) Average for the particular period [30-
Day Sample / Auction Period (A) / Suspension Period (S)]; (3) Standard Deviation of Returns; (4) 
Skewness of Returns; (5) Excess Kurtosis of Returns; (6) Mean of Squared Returns; (7) Standard 
Deviation of Squared Returns; (8) Maximum Squared Return; and (9) Minimum Squared Return.   
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Table 6: Reinforcements and reversals of opening returns 
 
Day Op - 10:15 10:15-12:30 10:15-Cl RF / REV - 12:30 RF / REV - Cl. 
      
A 1 0.56% 1.44% 0.16% RF RF 
A 2 1.30% 0.61% 0.45% RF RF 
A 3 0.85% -1.01% -1.90% REV REV 
A 4 -0.66% 1.07% 1.09% REV REV 
A 5 -0.13% 0.62% 0.89% REV REV 
A 6 0.61% -1.99% -2.72% REV REV 
A 7 -0.49% 1.53% -3.41% REV RF 
A 8 0.09% -2.50% -1.01% REV REV 
A 9 3.53% -0.09% 1.14% REV RF 
A 10 -1.01% 1.47% 0.29% REV REV 
A 11 -0.28% -0.90% 0.41% RF REV 
A 12 0.73% -0.35% 0.26% REV RF 
A 13 1.90% -0.40% -0.26% REV REV 
A 14 0.68% 0.08% -0.51% RF REV 
A 15 -1.42% 1.85% 3.26% REV REV 
      
S 1 -0.05% 0.01% -1.45% REV RF 
S 2 1.00% -0.21% -1.11% REV REV 
S 3 -0.08% -1.40% -1.67% RF RF 
S 4 -3.02% 0.47% 2.10% REV REV 
S 5 0.48% 0.08% -1.44% RF REV 
S 6 -0.24% -0.41% 2.80% RF REV 
S 7 0.95% 1.09% 1.48% RF RF 
S 8 0.27% 0.08% -0.47% RF REV 
S 9 0.87% 0.63% 1.44% RF RF 
S 10 0.62% 0.44% 0.59% RF RF 
S 11 0.41% -1.79% -2.49% REV REV 
S 12 -0.48% -0.64% -0.58% RF RF 
S 13 0.53% 0.42% -0.74% RF REV 
S 14 0.48% -0.73% -0.51% REV REV 
S 15 -0.19% -0.56% -0.31% RF RF 
 
REV:  16 REV:  18 30-DAY SAMPLE: 
 RF:  14 RF:   12 
REV: 11 REV:  10 AUCTION PERIOD: 
 RF:   4 RF:   5 
REV: 5 REV:  8 SUSPENSION PERIOD: 
 RF:  10 RF:    7 
 
The table shows intra-day returns for the 15 trading days in the auction period (A) and the 15 
trading days in the suspension period (S).  The returns columns show the % changes in the 
index level from the opening to 10:15, from 10:15 till 12:30, and from 10:15 till the end of the 
day.  When the direction of the opening return is the same as that of the subsequent return, 
the sequence is classified as a reinforcement (RF).  When the opening return changes 
direction during the rest of the day, the sequence is classified as a reversal (RV).   
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Footnotes 
 
                                                 
1 We used the asymmetric volatility test of Engle and Ng (1993) where the squared error term from 
an AR(1) model is regressed over a constant, an error term and a dummy variable of the lagged 
error sign which denotes asymmetric volatility.  The latter was only significant in four trading days 
out of fifteen. 
 
2 Dummy variables were also included in GARCH models to account for higher volatility at the 
opening and at the close, yet these estimations tended not to converge. 
 
3 We inquired whether there was a tendency for overreactions (reversals) to coincide with bad news 
(negative initial returns), in line with Klößner, Becker and Friedmann (2012).  Whilst initial negative 
returns were reversed / partially reversed by the end of the day in 58% of the cases, initial positive 
returns were reversed / partially reversed in 61% of the cases, suggesting that reversals in our 
sample are not associated with bad news. 
